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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TWELFTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1961
THURSDAY BRAM,
Appellant,
V.
UNITED STATES,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of DePaulia.
No. 11 X 123 - Jane A. Lawless, Judge.
ARGUED August 11, 2011 - DECIDED November 14, 2011
Before ECCLESTON, TENNANT, and KINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
TENNANT, Circuit Judge. Appellant Thursday Bram was
convicted on three counts of theft of an object of cultural heritage
from a museum, in violation of the Theft of Major Artwork Act,
18 U.S.C. § 668. On appeal, she contends that the Theft of Major
Artwork Act is unconstitutional because Congress exceeded its
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. In the alternative,
she asserts that, even if the Theft of Major Artwork Act does not
offend the Commerce Clause, the objects stolen were not under the
"care, custody or control" of the Galisteo Foundation and, thus,
their theft does not fall under the purview of that statute. For the
reasons that follow, we reject Ms. Bram's arguments and affirm
the judgment of the District Court.
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I.
At the time of her arrest, Thursday Brain was the personal
secretary of Maxwell Smith and occasional curator of Mr. Smith's
extensive private collection of objects documenting the history of
travel and exploration. The collection, and Mr. Smith, resided in
Galisteo House, an estate of some historical significance to the
community of Galisteo, DePaulia. Galisteo House and its six-acre
garden were designed between 1908 and 1910 by the French
architect Andr6 Wolenski as his personal residence. Wolenski was
renowned during his active career as a proponent of the modernist
architecture movement and was a mentor to and close friend of the
Swiss-born architect known as Le Corbusier, one of the pioneers
of what is now called Modern architecture or the International
style. While Galisteo House is not generally considered one of
Wolenski's most accomplished constructions, it is the only
example of his work this side of the Mississippi River. Wolenski
departed DePaulia in 1915.
Maxwell Smith purchased Galisteo House in 1997. A distant
relation of Wolenski, he made his own mark as an architect when,
in 1967, at the age of twenty-five, he won the commission to
design the new DePaulia City opera house. Mr. Smith retired as
an architect in 1996 and chose Galisteo House as a home that
could provide him with both a private retreat and a dramatic space
in which to display his extensive collection of cultural and natural
artifacts. His collection of over 200 objects, spanning 500 years of
human history, is the product of a lifelong fascination with great
adventurers, exploration, and travel.
In April 1999, Mr. Smith filed papers with the State of DePaulia
to form a nonprofit, educational corporation, called the "Galisteo
Foundation." The articles of incorporation stated, inter alia, that
"the Galisteo Foundation's essential purpose is to educate the
public about, and commemorate, one of the 2 0th century's most
important architects, Andr6 Wolenski, through the display of the
home he designed and in which he lived." Mr. Smith transferred
ownership of Galisteo House, its fixtures, and its surrounding
grounds to the Foundation, but he continued to reside there. Apart
from the fixtures, all the furnishings at Galisteo House were Mr.
Smith's personal property, including the collection of artifacts.
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In preparation for opening Galisteo House and the grounds to
visitors, the Foundation purchased signage, plantings, and paper
goods from businesses located throughout the United States. Mr.
Smith himself designed the plans for architecturally compatible
aids to accommodate visitors with physical disabilities, the
execution of which was handled by an out-of-state engineering
firm. In addition, some minor work on the house was carried out
by an architectural restoration team based outside of the State of
DePaulia.
Since July 1999, the House and grounds have been open to the
public one weekend every month. On other days, special tours are
provided to visitors upon application. Visitors come to view not
only Galisteo House, but also Mr. Smith's extraordinary private
collection of artifacts, some of which are on display. Since the
Galisteo Foundation has opened it to the public, Galisteo House
has received both in-state and out-of-state visitors.
In July 1999, acting in his capacity as director of the Galisteo
Foundation, Mr. Smith hired a part-time property manager to
maintain the House and to provide educational walking tours of
the property and his collection to visitors. He also hired a part-
time gardener to maintain the grounds. That same month, Mr.
Smith hired Thursday Brain to serve as his personal secretary and
occasional housekeeper. Ms. Brain worked for Mr. Smith for
approximately nine years. She lived in a guest cottage adjacent to
Galisteo House and worked from an office in the main house.
Over the course of her employment, Ms. Bram's duties expanded
to include cataloguing items in Mr. Smith's collection and,
occasionally, escorting visitors around the grounds of the estate.
In August 2007, upon returning from an extended trip abroad,
Mr. Smith discovered that five items were missing from his
collection-a set of ice picks given to Tenzing Norgay by Sir
Edmund Hillary, which had been used to reach the summit of Mt.
Everest on May 29, 1953; the flight suit worn by Charles "Chuck"
Yeager on October 14, 1947, while piloting the Bell X-1, the first
aircraft to travel faster than the speed of sound; a letter from Friar
Marcos de Niza, dated 1539, describing the legendary Seven Cities
of Cibola; a scrimshaw whale's tooth produced by James
Adolphus Bute during Charles Darwin's voyage on HMS Beagle,
depicting on one side a group of Fuegan natives in a canoe in the
529
3
DePaul College of Law: 2012 Cultural Heritage Moot Competition Problem
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol.XXII:527
Beagle Channel, and on the other a settlement on Queen's Island,
Tahiti; and a wall map of the United States by Osgood Carleton
(1742-1816), which updated his 1806 map, possibly as a result of
the Lewis and Clark expedition. All of the items except for the de
Niza letter had been located in areas of Galisteo House that are
accessible to the public. The letter had been kept in a clothes
closet in the Foundation's office.
Mr. Smith reported the thefts to the local police, who were
unable to produce any leads. Then, in June 2008, Mr. Smith
caught Ms. Brain in the act of removing from the grounds of
Galisteo House a pair of skis used by Roald Amundsen on his
1911 expedition to the South Pole, and notified law enforcement.
After she was taken into custody, Ms. Bram admitted to having
stolen the five items on separate occasions during July and August
of 2007. In the course of a subsequent consensual search of Ms.
Bram's cottage in Galisteo and a private cabin in the mountains
near Cloudcroft, DePaulia, all five of the items stolen in 2007 were
recovered.
Thursday Brain was charged in September 2009 with the theft of
the de Niza letter, the whale's tooth scrimshaw, and the Carleton
map. In March 2010, a grand jury indicted Ms. Bram on a
superseding indictment charging her with three counts of theft of
an object of cultural heritage from a museum, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 668.
Prior to her bench trial, Ms. Bram stipulated that she knew at the
time of the thefts that each of the three objects was over 100 years
old and each had a value in excess of $5,000. In January 2011, the
District Court entered judgment against Ms. Brain on all three
counts and sentenced her to a period of 33 months of
imprisonment, to be followed by 24 months of supervised release.
II.
Bram challenges her conviction under the Theft of Major
Artwork Act, 18 U.S.C. § 668. In support of her appeal, Brain
advances two alternative arguments. First, she contends that, in
enacting the Theft of Major Artwork Act, Congress exceeded its
power to legislate under the Commerce Clause. Second, she
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asserts that, even if the Act does not offend the Commerce Clause,
the objects stolen were not under the "care, custody or control" of
the Galisteo Foundation and, thus, their theft does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the Act. We address each of her arguments in
turn.
A. Constitutionality of the Act
The Theft of Major Artwork Act, 18 U.S.C. § 668, imposes
federal criminal penalties on one who "steals or obtains by fraud
from the care, custody, or control of a museum any object of
cultural heritage." "Museum" is defined in the statute as "an
organized and permanent institution, the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce," 18 U.S.C. § 668 (a)(1), which, in
addition "is situated in the United States; . . . is established for an
essentially educational or aesthetic purpose; . . . has a professional
staff; and . . . owns, utilizes, and cares for tangible objects that are
exhibited to the public on a regular schedule." 18 U.S.C. § 668
(a)(1)(A)-(D). An "object of cultural heritage" is "an object that
is-(A) over 100 years old and worth in excess of $5,000; or (B)
worth at least $100,000." 18 U.S.C. § 668 (a)(2).
Brain contends that 18 U.S.C. § 668, the Theft of Major
Artwork Act, exceeds the authority vested in Congress "[tlo
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States. . . ." U.S.
Const., Art. I. § 8 cl. 3. The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may regulate under its Commerce Clause power in three ways:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels
of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is
empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities.
Finally Congress' commerce authority includes the
power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
558-59 (1995) (citations omitted).
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Here, we need examine only the third prong of the Commerce
Clause power,' since 18 U.S.C. § 668 criminalizes the theft of
objects of cultural heritage from a museum, which by definition
must be an institution whose activities affect interstate commerce.
United States v. O'Higgins, 55 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). Because we find the Theft of Major Artwork Act to be
constitutional under the third prong of Lopez, we do not need to
address the dissent's analysis of the second prong in which it
contends that the Galisteo Foundation is not an instrumentality of
interstate commerce.
We review de novo Brain's constitutional challenge to the Theft
of Major Artwork Act. See United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522,
527 (6th Cir. 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-
2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *8(6th Cir. Jun. 29, 2011). Where a
challenge is brought to Congress' power to enact legislation under
the Commerce Clause, judicial review is narrow and deferential.
See Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981). The statute is entitled to a "presumption of
constitutionality" and is only to be invalidated upon a "plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). Where, as
here, Congress has enacted the statute pursuant to a theory that the
activity regulated substantially affects interstate commerce,
judicial inquiry is limited to determining whether Congress had a
rational basis for reaching that conclusion. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at
557; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d
292, 296 (2d Cir. 1998).
Beginning with its decision in Lopez, the Supreme Court has
identified two ways in which a statute may satisfy the third prong
of the Commerce Clause power. The substantial effects test may
be satisfied: (1) where intrastate economic activity, when viewed
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce, or (2)
where a criminal statute contains a "jurisdictional element which
would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [regulated
activity] in question affects interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S.
1. The government concedes that the Galisteo Foundation is not a "channel
of interstate commerce." We therefore need not address the first prong of
Lopez.
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at 559, 561. Unlike the statute invalidated in Lopez, the Theft of
Major Artwork Act satisfies the substantial effects test in both
ways.
1. Substantial effect on interstate commerce
It requires no piling up of "inference upon inference," Lopez,
514 U.S. at 567, to find a rational basis for concluding that the
theft of objects of cultural heritage, when taken in the aggregate, is
an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Although the thefts at issue here did not result in the introduction
of the objects into the stream of commerce, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that when "a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)
(quotations omitted); see also United States v. Goodwin, 141 F.3d
394, 399-400 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Lopez did not require
that the individual transaction at issue in a money laundering case
substantially affect interstate commerce).
The legislative background to the Act, which was enacted in
1994 as part of an omnibus crime bill,2 confirms that Congress was
concerned that major art theft represented a widespread problem
requiring a coordinated, federal response. In offering an
amendment to a 1991 bill containing language substantially similar
to the enacted Theft of Major Artwork Act, Senator Kennedy
remarked,
Ninety percent of stolen art is never recovered; however, 40
percent of well-known works are recovered because the notoriety
of the theft makes the works difficult to sell or even display.
Stolen works of art are often irreplaceable. As a result,
museums are forced to undertake expensive measures to protect
their treasures, and the burden is equally great on smaller and less
established museums and galleries.
Art theft may well be the world's most profitable criminal trade
after illegal narcotics. The worldwide market for stolen art is
2. Pub. L. 103-322, Title XXXII, Subtitle 1, § 320902(a), 108 Stat. 1796,
2123-24 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 668 (1994)).
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estimated to run as high as $1 to $2 billion annually, about the size
of the legitimate art business in 1989. Indeed, a number of drug
traffickers use art works to launder money. Only recently have
there been any efforts to develop an international computerized
register of stolen artwork.
The [Act] is an important step toward addressing
the serious problem of art thefts and punishing
those who assault our cultural heritage by depriving
us of these great works. 137 Cong. Rec. S9088
(Jun. 28, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
In support of the remarks quoted above, Senator Kennedy
offered for reproduction in the Congressional Record three articles
detailing the March 18, 1990, theft from the Isabella Stewart
Gardner Museum of numerous priceless works of art, including a
Vermeer, three Rembrandts, and five works by Degas. See id. at
S9088-90. Collectively, the works had an estimated value of
approximately $200 million in 1991. Id.
Indeed, the theft of objects of cultural heritage in the aggregate
can have a substantial impact on the national and international art
market. Works of art are typically stolen for the purpose of resale,
which affects the prices of art not just within the borders of the
jurisdiction from which the work was stolen, but across state and
national borders, even if the stolen works never crossed a state
line.' Such thefts also drive up the costs that museums incur to
insure their works of art.4
Congress thus had a rational basis for concluding that
"criminalizing the theft of objects of cultural heritage from
museums will reduce interstate trafficking in stolen art and thus is
3. Frank Browning, Stolen Fine Art: Organized Crime's New Commodity?,
NPR.org, May 31, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=10588693.
4. See Goran Mijuk, Demand for Insurance on Art Increases, Wall St. J.,
Jun. 5, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB121260605636245893.html.
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'an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the
intrastate activity were regulated."' O'Higgins, 55 F. Supp. 2d at
175 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also Thomas More Ctr.,
No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *12-14 (holding that
Congress could regulate the practice of self-insuring for the cost of
health care under the Commerce Clause because failure to do so
would undercut its regulation of the interstate markets in health
care delivery and insurance).
2. Jurisdictional element
In addition, the Theft of Major Artwork Act incorporates a
jurisdictional element that requires a connection between the thefts
in question and interstate commerce. The express inclusion of a
jurisdictional element in the language of a statute "precludes any
serious challenge" to the constitutionality of that statute on
Commerce Clause grounds. Goodwin, 141 F.3d at 399-400.
Here, the Theft of Major Artwork Act proscribes stealing, or
obtaining by fraud, any object of cultural heritage in the "care,
custody, or control of a museum . .. the activities of which affect
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 668 (emphasis
added). The defendant's own conduct need not be in the realm of
interstate commerce. O'Higgins, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 175. To hold
otherwise would represent a departure from the framework
established by Lopez and contravene established law. See id.
(citing Goodwin, 141 F.3d at 399-400 (upholding the money
laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, where the statute prohibited a
financial transaction involving "the use of a financial institution
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce in any way or degree.")).
The act of theft is not itself a commercial activity, but under
prevailing law, it need not be; the jurisdictional element of a
criminal statute is sufficient where the nexus between the regulated
criminal act and interstate commerce was satisfied by the victim's
status or activities. See, e.g., United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486,
491 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming Hobbs Act conviction where
defendant robbed six stores because all the victimized businesses
were engaged in interstate commerce); United States v. Jackson,
535
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748 F.2d 1535, 1537-38 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming Hobbs Act
conviction where defendant's extortion of a bribe from land
developers established a sufficient jurisdictional element because
the extorted payment depleted assets of victim's construction
business, which was engaged in interstate commerce); United
States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming
Hobbs Act conviction where extortion threat regarding disclosure
of marital infidelity established a sufficient jurisdictional element
because the defendant threatened to tell the victim's employer, who
was engaged in interstate commerce).
Here, the theft of objects of cultural heritage from a museum,
"the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce,"
impacts interstate commerce, even if the theft itself is not a
commercial act. "Common sense suggests that stealing objects of
cultural heritage from a museum significantly impacts the
institution's mission. As the museum's activities affect interstate
commerce, thefts from the museum do so as well." O'Higgins, 55
F. Supp. 2d at 175.
We hold that a rational basis exists for concluding that the theft
of objects of cultural heritage, in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce. In addition, the Theft of Major
Artwork Act contains a jurisdictional element that ensures, through
a case-by-case inquiry, that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce. Accordingly, this Court finds that Bram's Commerce
Clause challenge is without merit.
B. Application of the Act
We turn now to Brain's challenge to the application of the Act to
the thefts in question.
The Theft of Major Artwork Act provides that "[a] person who.
steals or obtains by fraud from the care, custody, or control of a
museum any object of cultural heritage . . . shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." 18 U.S.C. §
668(b)(1). A "museum," is "an organized and permanent
institution, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce, that . . . is situated in the United States; . . . is
established for an essentially educational or aesthetic purpose; . ..
has a professional staff; and . . . owns, utilizes, and cares for
536
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tangible objects that are exhibited to the public on a regular
schedule." 18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(1).
Brain stipulates that the de Niza letter, the whale's tooth, and the
Carleton map meet the definition of "object of cultural heritage"
under the Theft of Major Artwork Act, 18 U.S.C. § 668, and that
she knew these artifacts were objects of cultural heritage, as
defined, when she stole them. Brain argues, however, that the
stolen artifacts were not under the Galisteo Foundation's "care,
custody, or control," but under the sole care, custody, or control of
Maxwell Smith.
Having jurisdiction over Brain's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, we review de novo the district court's interpretation of the
Theft of Major Artwork Act's statutory language. See United
States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 146 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Statutory
interpretation is something a district court undertakes as a matter
of law . . . . We review legal determinations made by a district
court de novo"); Lorenz v. Sauer, 807 F.2d 1509, 1511 (9th Cir.
1987) ("The district court's construction of [a] statute, a legal
question, is reviewed de novo").
Resolving Bram's claim requires this Court to construe the
meaning of "care, custody, or control" in the context of the Theft
of Major Artwork Act. Although the issue raised by Bram's
appeal is one of first impression, the well-established principles of
statutory construction apply here.
It is a fundamental canon of construction that "the starting point
for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.
Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980). Further, "unless otherwise defined, words will be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing
Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)).
Under the Theft of Major Artwork Act, a person commits a
federal crime when she steals "any object of cultural heritage"
from the "care, custody, or control" of a "museum." The terms
"object of cultural heritage" and "museum" are defined in the
statute, but "care, custody, or control" is not. Without statutory
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guidance as to the intended meaning of these terms, we must
determine their ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides, under
the definition of "care": "charge, supervision, management:
responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being," and
"custody: temporary charge . . . ." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 338 (3d ed. 1993). For "custody,"
Webster's provides, "the act or duty of guarding and preserving (as
by a duly authorized person or agency)." Id. at 559. Finally, as to
"control," Webster's provides, "to exercise restraining or directing
influence over . .. to have power over." Id. at 496. As a matter of
common usage, therefore, "care, custody, or control" speaks to the
role that the museum undertakes in exercising responsibility for
the objects, guarding and preserving the objects, and having power
over the objects.
At the outset, we need not read into the definition of "care,
custody, or control" an implicit requirement that the museum
exercising such care, custody, or control of objects of cultural
heritage also be the owner of such objects.' Our reading of "care,
custody, or control" is consistent with the approach of the only
other decision to address this aspect of the Theft of Major Artwork
Act, United States v. Pritchard, 346 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2003). In
Pritchard, the Third Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 668 for the theft of objects of cultural heritage
that belonged to a private individual but were located at the time of
the theft in a warehouse under the care and custody of the Hunt-
Phelan Home Foundation and Elvis Presley Enterprises.
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 475-76. In construing the definition of
5. Variations of the term "care, custody, or control" appear elsewhere in the
United States Code, and an examination of these statutes is instructive. For
example, 18 U.S.C. § 666, enacted in 1984, makes it a federal crime for an agent
of an organization, government, or agency to, inter alia, embezzle property of a
certain value that "is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such
organization, government, or agency . . . ." Clearly, Congress recognized a
distinction between the concept of ownership and the concepts of care, custody,
and control. See also United States v. Briston, No. 04-58, 2009 WL 412695, at
*6 n.6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009) ("Rather, the statute provides that the property
must by 'owned by, or [ ] under the care, custody, or control of such
organization, government, or agency."') (emphasis in original).
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"museum" in order to determine whether the Act applied to the
defendant's actions, the Court found that the Hunt-Phelan Home
Foundation "owned, utilized, and cared for tangible objects that
are exhibited to the public on a regular schedule"-the Hunt-
Phelan Home. Id. at 475. The Court drew a distinction between
the objects owned by the Foundation and the objects stolen by the
defendant, holding that the Foundation must own, use, and care for
some object that is exhibited to the public for purposes of
conforming to the Act's definition of "museum," but the objects
stolen need not have been owned by the Foundation, as long as
they were in the museum's "care, custody, or control." Id.
As in Pritchard, the Galisteo Foundation owns, uses, and cares
for at least one tangible object-Galisteo House itself. And, as in
Pritchard, the whale's tooth, the de Niza letter and the Carleton
map were in the care, custody, or control of the Galisteo
Foundation at the time they were stolen. Although each of these
objects belonged to Maxwell Smith, they were kept within the
physical confines of Galisteo House. As the Galisteo Foundation
restrains, influences, or has power over the ingress and egress to
Galisteo House, it also restrains, influences, or has power over
access to everything located on the property, including the objects
of cultural heritage stolen by Brain. Moreover, at the time
Maxwell Smith was abroad, the Foundation temporarily had sole
power over access to everything located on the property.
Consequently, we find that the Galisteo Foundation had care,
custody, and control of the stolen objects of cultural heritage.6
By knowingly stealing the de Niza letter, the whale's tooth, and
the Carleton map from the grounds of the Galisteo Foundation,
Brain committed a federal crime. As the stolen artifacts are
objects of cultural heritage, the evidence is sufficient to affirm her
felony conviction under the Theft of Major Artwork Act, 18
U.S.C. § 668.
6. Congress' use of the disjunctive in 18 U.S.C. § 668(b)(1) is significant.
Because the provision is worded to read "care, custody, or control," only one of
these conditions need be met. Here, it is not necessary to find that the Galisteo
Foundation cared for or had custody of the cultural objects; because the
Foundation physically controlled the stolen objects at the time of the thefts, it
satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 668(b)(1).
539
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The ruling of the district court is AFFIRMED.
KINGSTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I dissent because I do not
agree with the majority that the Theft of Major Artwork Act is
properly analyzed under the third prong of Lopez, and because I do
not believe that the scrimshaw whale's tooth, the de Niza letter,
and the Carleton map were under the "care, custody or control" of
the Galisteo Foundation. Consequently, I would vacate the
conviction of the district court and dismiss the indictment.
A. Constitutionality Under the Commerce Clause
1. The Act is not a permissible exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause authority when analyzed under the third prong of
Lopez
Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate: (1)
channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce,
and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
I disagree with the majority that the applicable rationale for
Congress' authority to enact the Theft of Major Artwork Act is the
third prong of Commerce Clause authority under Lopez, namely,
the authority to regulate those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. In scrutinizing this prong, the Supreme
Court has "identified a clear pattern of analysis: 'Where economic
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained."' Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 610 (2000)). "'Economics' refers to the 'production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities."' Id. at 26
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 720
(1966)). "[T]he Founders conceived of 'commerce' as 'trade,' the
interchange of goods by one State with another." Raoul Berger,
Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 Tex. L. Rev.
695, 703 (1996). See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. HHS, No. 3:10-cv-
91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *11 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Florida Attorney Gen. v. HHS,
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Nos. 11-1 1021, 11-11067, 2011 WL 3519178 (11th Cir. Aug. 12,
2011); see also generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning
of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001). Thus,
despite Congress' findings that violence against women had an
adverse impact on interstate commerce, the Court held the
Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional because it did not
regulate economic activity. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 (referring to
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). Similarly, the
Court concluded that the noneconomic nature of gun possession
within 1,000 feet of a school was central to the Court's holding in
Lopez that the Gun Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional.
Id. (referring to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
In determining that Congress permissibly enacted the Theft of
Major Artwork Act, the majority cites United States v. O'Higgins,
55 F. Supp. 2d 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), to date the only case to
address this issue directly. The O'Higgins court accepted the
Government's conclusory statements, made in the Government's
post-trial brief, that theft of objects of cultural heritage "has a
substantial impact on the national economy," O'Higgins, 55 F.
Supp. 2d at 174, and assumed, without any corroborating evidence,
that artwork is stolen for resale and affects art prices in general, id
at 174-75. Here, the majority assumes the same, and in doing so,
adopts a similar rationale. I disagree. Theft has nothing to do with
the production, distribution, or consumption of commodities and,
thus, it is not an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. In light of the Supreme Court's own analysis of its
Commerce Clause decisions, the activity being regulated must be
economic in nature.7
Alternatively, the majority relies on the words "the activities of
which affect interstate commerce" in the definition of "museum"
to provide the jurisdictional element that ensures, through a case-
7. Because the Supreme Court in Raich emphasized economic activity as a
determining factor in the Court's scrutiny of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, I respectfully disagree with the finding of the Sixth Circuit that
Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activity if doing so is essential to
a larger scheme that regulates economic activity. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v.
Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *9 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011).
Regardless of whether the regulated activity is interstate or intrastate or, for that
matter, commercial, the activity must, at a minimum, be economic.
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by-case inquiry, that the activity regulated by the Theft of Major
Artwork Act affects interstate commerce. The majority concludes
that the jurisdictional element precludes any serious challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute as beyond the Commerce Clause
because it guarantees a legitimate nexus with interstate commerce.
Theft, however, being a noneconomic activity, is not an activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce and, thus, under no
case does it affect interstate commerce. Consequently, the Theft
of Major Artwork Act is not a permissible exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause power under the third prong of Lopez.
2. The Act is properly scrutinized under the second prong of
Lopez
Under the Commerce Clause, "Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . .
. even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities."
Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558); see also United States v. Mandel, 647
F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d
254, 258 (5th Cir. 2009). "When Congress regulates and protects
under the second Lopez category . . . federal jurisdiction is
supplied by the nature of the instrumentality or facility used . ...
United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) (en
banc); see also Mandel, 647 F.3d at 722; United States v. Jacques,
No. 2:08-cr-117, 2011 WL 1706765, at *9 (D. Vt. 2011) (citations
omitted).
An "instrumentality" is "the condition, quality, or fact of . . .
serving as a means . . . or agency." Webster's New World
Dictionary 701 (3d College ed. 1988). An instrumentality of
interstate commerce, thus, is the condition, quality, or fact of
serving as a means or agency of interstate commerce.8
8. In addition, "[instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... are the people
and things themselves moving in commerce . . . ." United States v. Ballinger,
395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (1lth Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Foley v.
JetBlue Airways, Corp., No. C 10-3882 JCS, 2011 WL 3359730, at *15 n.9
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011); United States v. Ditomasso, 552 F. Supp. 2d 233, 246
(D.R.I. 2008).
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A non-profit institution, such as the Galisteo Foundation, can
qualify as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. In Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 586
(1997), the Supreme Court stated:
For purposes of Commerce Clause analysis, any
categorical distinction between the activities of
profit-making enterprises and not-for-profit entities
is . . . wholly illusory. Entities in both categories
are major participants in interstate markets. And,
although the [non-profit organization] involved in
this case may have a relatively insignificant impact
on the commerce of the entire Nation, the interstate
commercial activities of nonprofit entities as a class
are unquestionably significant.
See also United States v. Laton, 352 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.
2003) ("Nonprofit institutions can also impact interstate
commerce."). For example, churches have been found to engage
in interstate commerce by providing for "a broad range of
religious, cultural, social, recreational, welfare, educational and
financial activities," United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1204
(10th Cir. 2001), so long as the evidence of these activities involve
the building's business of being a church. United States v. Odum,
252 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001).
Similarly, museums can engage in interstate commerce if they
provide a broad range of cultural, social and educational activities,
and those activities involve the museum's "business" of being a
museum. Evidence to this effect, if proved, would qualify the
museum as an instrumentality of interstate commerce that may
permissibly be regulated by Congress. Consequently, if a
"museum" as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 668 is an instrumentality
of interstate commerce, then the enactment of the Theft of Major
Artwork Act was clearly permissible under Lopez's second prong
of Commerce Clause authority.
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3. The constitutional issue is properly avoided because the
Galisteo Foundation does not meet the statutory definition of
museum"
It is a longstanding principle that "where a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (quoting United States ex
rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)). Even if an examination of 18 U.S.C. § 668 is properly
conducted under the second prong of Lopez, this Court may, and
should, avoid the constitutional issue, but should nonetheless
conclude that the Galisteo Foundation does not meet the statutory
definition of "museum."
In Jones, the Supreme Court instructed that the proper inquiry
for a court presented with an arson charge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
844(i) is first to determine "the function of the building itself and
then . . . whether that function affects interstate commerce." 529
U.S. at 854 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th
Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). This type of inquiry, which avoids the constitutional issue,
is equally applicable to the Theft of Major Artwork Act. A
museum is defined under the Act as "an organized and permanent
institution, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(1). Following the reasoning in
Jones, the proper inquiry for a court presented with the charge of
theft of an object of cultural heritage pursuant to the Theft of
Major Artwork Act is first to determine the activities of the victim
institution and then to determine whether those activities affect
interstate commerce.
"Activities affecting interstate commerce" is most sensibly read
to mean that, in order for an otherwise conforming institution to
qualify as a "museum" for purposes of the Theft of Major Artwork
Act, the institution acts for commercial purposes and does not
merely have a "passive, passing, or past connection to commerce."
Jones, 529 U.S. at 855. Here, the Government offers the receipt of
services (installing aids to accommodate visitors with physical
disabilities and restoring a residence) and goods (signage,
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plantings, and paper goods) from out-of-state suppliers to show
that the Galisteo Foundation's activities affected interstate
commerce. Such is not sufficient to show that the Galisteo
Foundation acted for a commercial purpose or was the locus of any
commercial undertaking. The receipt of services and goods from
out-of-state suppliers is no different than the receipt of gas that has
moved interstate, or a mortgage or insurance policy-all activities
which the Supreme Court has characterized as merely having a
passive, passing, or past connection to interstate commerce, rather
than acts that are undertaken for a commercial purpose. See Jones,
529 U.S. at 856-57.
"Judges should hesitate . . . to treat statutory terms in any setting
[as surplusage], and resistance should be heightened when the
words describe an element of a criminal offense." Jones, 529 U.S.
at 857 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41
(1994)). Were this Court to adopt such an expansive interpretation
of "activities which affect interstate commerce" for purposes of
triggering 18 U.S.C. § 668, every institution that otherwise
satisfied the definition of "museum" in the statute would satisfy
this element, and the Act's limiting language ("the activities of
which affect interstate commerce") would have no significance.
I would hold that it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional
question that would arise were this Court to read 18 U.S.C. § 668
to render the traditionally local criminal conduct by petitioner
Bram-theft from an institution that receives services and goods
from out-of-state suppliers-a matter for federal enforcement. See
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971). 1 believe that
Congress, in fitting this statute within a proper constitutional
framework, left cases of theft from such institutions to the law
enforcement authorities of the States.
I find that the Government has not met its burden of proving an
element of its case, namely that the Galisteo Foundation is a
"museum" for purposes of the Theft of Major Artwork Act,
because the Government has not proved that the Foundation's
activities affect interstate commerce. As a result, the Galisteo
Foundation is not an instrumentality of interstate commerce that
may be regulated by Congress under the second prong of Lopez.
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B. Construction of "Care, Custody, or Control"
The majority also holds that the whale's tooth, the de Niza letter,
and the Carleton map were objects of cultural heritage stolen from
the care, custody, or control of a museum. I agree with the
majority that these three objects fit within the statutory definition
of "cultural heritage" at 18 U.S.C. § 668(a)(2)(A), as each one is
an object over 100 years old and worth more than $5,000. I do not
agree, however, that these objects were under the "care, custody,
or control" of the Galisteo Foundation when they were stolen from
the Galisteo House property. On the contrary, they were under the
care, custody, or control of Maxwell Smith alone.
Because the Theft of Major Artwork statute does not define the
words "care, custody, or control," the majority takes the ordinary
and everyday meaning associated with those words and creates a
bright-line test to determine whether the scrimshaw whale's tooth,
the de Niza letter, and the Carleton map were in the "care, custody,
or control" of the Galisteo Foundation. Under this bright-line
approach, the majority argues that, as the Galisteo Foundation
controls ingress and egress to the Galisteo House property, it has
"care, custody, or control" of all objects situated there, irrespective
of whether those objects are (1) owned by the Foundation; (2)
borrowed by the Foundation; (3) subject to a bailment; or (4) the
personal property or effects of Maxwell Smith, whose residence is
Galisteo House.
The majority's bright-line rule is inconsistent with how federal
courts have determined the meaning of "care, custody, or control"
within the context of other criminal statutes. One such statute
reads:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal
or purloin, any property or money or any other
thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in
the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; 18
U.S.C. § 2113(b) (emphasis added).
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In interpreting this statute, federal courts have uniformly held
that money being transported by armored carriers from a bank to
the Federal Reserve is not in the care, custody, or control of the
armored carrier even though, during the transport of this money,
the armored carrier controls the ingress and egress to that money.
United States v. King, 178 F.3d 1376, 1378 (11th Cir. 1999) ("It is,
of course, plain that the money, while in the care, custody, and
control of the [armored transport] was, in contemplation of the
law, in the custody, care and control of the bank."(citations
omitted)).
Similarly, under 18 U.S.C. § 668(b)(1), it is not the control of
the ingress and egress to the museum that necessarily gives the
Galisteo Foundation custody, care, or control of the objects within
the Galisteo House property. Rather, the Theft of Major Artwork
Act applies only to those objects of cultural heritage situated
within the confines of the Galisteo Foundation as contemplated by
the law. Put another way, the Act must be limited to cases in
which the object stolen is related to the essentially educational or
aesthetic purpose of the museum. See, e.g., United States v.
Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1071 (1994) (holding that section 6(c) of the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act is limited to cases in which the State or
local law that is violated is one related to the protection of
archaeological resources).
As already noted, the Galisteo Foundation was established as a
nonprofit organization to educate about and to commemorate the
work of Andr6 Wolenski, through the display of the home he
designed and in which he lived. Galisteo House was open to the
public, on a limited basis, in accordance with the bylaws of the
Foundation. Only Galisteo House, its fixtures, and its grounds
were owned by the Foundation.
Galisteo House was also the private residence of Maxwell Smith
and was used, as described by the majority, to "provide him with
both a private retreat and dramatic space in which to display his
extensive collection of cultural and natural artifacts." This private
collection of personal household effects in Mr. Smith's residence
is unrelated to the purpose of the Foundation, is unrelated to
Galisteo House, and is unrelated to the life of Andr6 Wolenski.
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Furthermore, the Galisteo Foundation has no rights in this
collection whatsoever.
The majority's reliance on the Third Circuit's decision in
Pritchard' is misplaced. In that case, the Court found that:
[w]hile there is no evidence in the record that the
Foundation owned any of the objects within the
house, the Hunt-Phelan Home Foundation owned
the house itself. And the house is clearly an object
of great historical and aesthetic significance.
Indeed, it was arguably the primary exhibit on the
property. The significance of the Foundation, and
the "cultural heritage" of the various objects and
exhibits it displayed, are integrally tied to the Hunt-
Phelan Home. Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 475
(emphasis added).
By contrast, the items in Mr. Smith's residence and owned by
him were not integrally tied to either Galisteo House or the
Galisteo Foundation, nor were they associated with or
commemorated the work or the life of Andr6 Wolenski.
Accordingly, the rationale of Pritchard is inapplicable to prove
that the Foundation had care, custody, or control of these objects.
Finally, the majority's broader interpretation of the Theft of
Major Artwork statute carries the law far beyond the objectives of
9. United States v. Pritchard, 346 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2003). In Pritchard, as
in the instant case, the nonprofit Hunt-Phelan Foundation was established to
operate the Hunt-Phelan House, an antebellum mansion in Memphis, Tennessee.
Pritchard, 346 F.3d at 471. The Hunt-Phelan House was restored to
approximate its condition in 1858, and "many of the items previously removed
were placed on display in the house including several antebellum furniture
pieces and thousands of books dating back as far as 1720." Id. Pritchard was
hired to "assist in assessing several of the objects associated with the house."
Id. After selecting two Civil War uniforms to take to Philadelphia for
authentication, Pritchard informed the owner, William B. Day, Jr., that one
uniform was only a costume, and that he had donated it to Goodwill. Id. When
it was discovered that Pritchard's son had sold the uniform to a private collector
in Georgia for $45,000, Pritchard was charged with one count of theft of an
object of cultural heritage and one count of aiding and abetting. Id.
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its framers. Thus, under the majority's bright-line test for
determining "care, custody, or control," a piece of jewelry stolen
from the purse of a patron who checked it at a museum's
cloakroom, if over 100 years old and worth more than $5,000,
would be an "object of cultural heritage" falling under 18 U.S.C. §
668. Certainly, the Theft of Major Artwork Act did not
contemplate such a result.
Each of the above bases is sufficient, in and of itself, to reverse
the judgment of the court below. Under any of these rationales, a
necessary element is absent, and I would therefore vacate the
conviction and dismiss the indictment with prejudice.
Consequently, I am compelled to dissent.
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